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THE EFFICIENT CONSUMER FORM 
CONTRACT: LAW AND ECONOMICS 
MEETS THE REAL WORLD 
Michael 1. Meyerson * 
"Law and economics" has been hailed by its supporters as the 
only intellectually valid means for analyzing legal issues. l Its critics 
have dismissed law and economics as amoral and biased against 
the poor.2 Ironically, each side in this frequently acrimonious de-
bate has much to offer those in the opposing camp. This Article 
reflects a modest attempt to bridge the chasm. 
One need not believe that money is everything in order to be-
lieve that the effect a given legal rule has on total societal wealth is 
relevant in decisionmaking. But this admission does not consign 
one to a legal world where the wealthy win as a matter of right and 
legal rulings are sold to the highest bidder. It may be surprising to 
the detractors of law and economics, but the proper application of 
principles of economic analysis need not lead to anti-poor results. 
If all relevant factors are considered, the concerns of fairness and 
of efficiency may coincide more often than partisans of either side 
in this debate have cared to admit.3 
Analysis based on efficiency tends to produce results of fairness 
when economic principles are properly applied to certain legal situ-
ations, such as interpretation of consumer form contracts. The eco-
nomic analysis of a complex problem begins with the selection of 
simplifying assumptions.4 A simplified model is considerably easier 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Lnw. B.A., 1976, Hamp-
shire College; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania. Funding for this Article provided by 
the University of Baltimore School of Law Summer Research Fund. I would like to thank 
Professors Robert Lande, Dennis Honabach and Richard CrllSwell for their llSSistnnce and 
advice. All opinions expressed and mistakes made are my own. 
1 See, e.g., R POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (2d ed. 1977). 
2 See, e.g., Letf', ECONOr.UC ANALYSIS OF LAW: Some Realism About Nominalism (Book 
Review), 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974). 
3 As a guide to the uninitiated, a discussion of the meaning and validity of "efficiency" is 
contained in the Appendix to this Article. See infra text accompnnying notes 208-32. 
• See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 3-4 (1983) (noting that 
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to understand and to control, and it tends to yield more useful 
hypotheses. II That certain common assumptions, such as "perfect 
information" or "perfect competition," are patently untrue and un-
realistic is unimportant in this analysis. In part, this is because a 
simple model will prove to be sufficient for many situations, espe-
cially when the hypotheses developed from it square with empiri-
cal research.6 
More importantly, once the basic principles have been estab-
lished, real world complexities can be added where needed to ad-
just the model to address a wider variety of situations. '7 The classic 
analogy is to Galileo's theory on the behavior of falling bodies:8 
Even though the theory is only correct for objects falling in a vac-
uum, it has helped our basic understanding of gravity. Moreover, 
by adjusting the theory for factors such as air pressure, scientists 
are able to predict accurately the differences between falling apples 
and falling feathers. 
One of the arts of the economist, therefore, is to create the sim-
plified model and then to select which complicating factors to add. 
While many have criticized the reliance on simplified models, I) the 
true problem lies not with economic analysis but with the ana-
lyst. lo Significant relevant factors must be included or the model 
may lead to grossly inaccurate predictions.ll Put another way, not-
economists solve complex sets of problems by isolating one or two problems and making 
simplifying assumptions that eliminate the others). 
• Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 301 (1979) 
[hereinafter Posner, Uses and Abusesl. 
• A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 4. 
1 See id. at 3-4 (stating that, by adding enough "special cases," one can get the full pic-
ture); Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 5, at 303·04 (stating that more complex models 
can be created to correct false assumptions). 
8 Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 5, at 301·04. In an earlier work, Posner referred to 
"Newton's law of falling bodies," R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 13, but the analogy remains 
the same. 
o E.g., Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTIIA 
L. REV. 591, 625 (1980) (terming assumptions used in economic analysis of law "counterfac-
tual"); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 647 (1980) (stating that 
what appears efficient under streamlined model, may not be when other, real-world factors 
are included). I. A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 126 (describing how faulty application of economic prin. 
ciples generates many of examples used in criticism of economic analysis as theory). 
11 Cf. Rizzo, supra note 9, at 658 (stating that while it is easy to show that efficiency leads 
to desirable results in a simplified model, it is necessary to show the results hold for the real 
world as well). 
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withstanding the brilliance of Galileo's falling bodies theory, it 
cannot help you to catch a falling leaf unless you accurately in-
clude the special physical characteristics of the leaf in your model. 
This Article will attempt to describe the special characteristics 
of the consumer form contract so that a proper economic model 
can be created. Part I of the Article describes the classic simplified 
model used to evaluate contract law. This section describes the ba-
sic assumptions economists use when analyzing contracts and dem-
onstrates how, under this analysis, reliance on individual sover-
eignty leads to economic efficiency. 
Part II paints an economic portrait of consumer form contracts. 
This section establishes that the most important special character-
istic of these contracts is that one party, the consumer, typically 
lacks accurate information concerning the terms of the contract 
and finds it inefficient to acquire the correct information. This im-
perfect consumer information causes a tendency toward ineffi-
ciency in transactions involving consumer form contracts. 
Part III of this Article creates a paradigm for interpreting con-
sumer form contracts that encourages economically efficient trans-
actions. The goal is to induce the party with the lower information 
costs, the seller, to disclose inefficient contract terms to the con-
sumer. Accordingly, consumer form contracts should be construed 
as consisting of three types of terms: those explicitly agreed to by 
both parties; those the seller led the consumer to believe would be 
in the contract; and "default" terms-presumptively efficient 
terms that the parties would likely have chosen had the consumer 
been fully informed. Of course, both parties are free to select any 
terms they wish, as long as there has been actual, knowing assent 
on both sides. 
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTS 
A. Fundamental Economic Assumptions of Contract Law 
1. The Paradigm of the Efficient Contract. For the study of con-
tract law in general, one of the most important economic assump-
tions is the assumption of "utility maximization." Individuals are 
presumed to act to maximize their total benefits minus costs. I:! 
12 A. POLINSKY, supra no~ 4, at 10. Similarly, it is presumed that business firms attempt 
to maximize profits. [d.; see also Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis 0/ the Efficiency 
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Thus, if voluntary exchange is permitted, resources will gravitate 
toward their most valuable use.13 For example, if A owns a tractor 
worth $100 to her but worth $150 to B, they will both be better off 
if B purchases the tractor for any sum between $100 and $150. 
Presumably, in a free market, the sale will take place. Moreover, 
societal wealth will also be increased by the sale, since both par-
ties' individual wealth has increased.14 
In a free market, exchanges among knowledgeable rational peo-
ple are expected to result in Pareto superior results, meaning that, 
after the transaction, at least one person is better off and no one is 
worse off.H; Because it is not rational to accept a deal that is not 
perceived to be in one's self-interest, what each party relinquishes 
in a bargain will be seen by that party as less valuable than what is 
received.16 Voluntary negotiations, therefore, are presumed to 
achieve Pareto superior results because of the assumption of utility 
maximization; in other words, voluntary negotiations tend to pro-
duce efficient results. 
One corollary of this principle is that government involvement in 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 497 (1980) [hereinafter Pos· 
ner, Common Law Adjudication] (stating that free market "maximizes autonomous, utility. 
seeking behavior"). 
13 A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979); R. POSNEII, 
supra note 1, at 9-10. Put in slightly different terms, freedom of contract serves the utilita' 
rian function of maximizing the welfare of the contracting parties, and thus society as a 
whole. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 (1975) • 
.. See, e.g., Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 86 (1984). In 
mathematical terms, and assuming a sale price of $135, societal wealth could be computed 
as follows: 
Ao = A's wealth before the sale 
Bo = B's wealth before the sale 
W 0 = Societal wealth before the sale 
Al = A's wealth after the sale 
BI = B's wealth after the sale 
WI = Societal wealth after the sale 
Ao + Bo = W 0; 100 + 135 = 235 = Wo 
Al + BI = WI; 135 + 150 = 285 = WI' 
I. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 516 
(1980). For a fuller discussion of "Pareto superiority," see infra text accompanying notes 
211-12. 
I. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that each person is presumed to be "rational 
maximizer of his ... self-interest"). This principle has also been termed the presumption of 
"consumer sovereignty." A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 10. As one early court decision stated, 
"The judgment of the purchaser is the best arbiter of whether the thing is of any value, and 
how great, to him." Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39, 41 (1851). 
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the marketplace is a second-best solution.l1 Because any govern-
ment intervention imposes costs and risks inefficiencies, such inter-
vention should occur only when the benefits of regulation exceed 
the costs. IS 
There is, however, universal recognition that the law should sup-
ply generalized contract terms so that contracting parties need not 
specify them.19 Another fundamental principle of the economic 
analysis of contract law is that a fully specified contract will be 
efficient.20 No contract, however, can be fully specified. There are 
simply too many conditions and contingencies regarding even the 
simplest transaction.21 So-called "default terms" or "gap fillers" re-
duce the complexity and cost of contract negotiation and help re-
solve disputes arising out of issues on which a given contract is 
silent.22 To be consistent with the principle that efficient contracts 
arise from voluntary negotiations, default rules must approximate 
what the parties would have agreed to had they negotiated the is-
sue.23 The rules would then tend to be efficient since both parties, 
17 See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: 
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 679 (1979) (labeling court.'s remedy 
second-best because judicial power cannot encourage markets to move toward competitive 
equilibrium but can only strike offensive terms or price). 
18 See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 18 (1960) (implying that 
government intervention should not be viewed as best way to reduce market costs because it 
will not always increase efficiency): Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. 
REV. 658, 726 (1985) (stating intervention should occur if it produces lower administrative 
costs without substantially increasing injury to the consumer); Darby & Karni, Free Compe-
tition and the Optimal Amount 0/ Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 83 (1973) (emphasizing that 
government intervention can improve resource allocation when benefits of improved moni-
toring exceed costs). 
19 See generally J. BENTHAM, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 191 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) (stating that every country has 
laws supplying omitted contract terms). 
'0 A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 29; see also R POSNER, supra note 1, at 11. 
21 See, e.g., G. TuLLOCK, THE LOGIC OF LAW 47 (1971) (stating that to put all conditions 
into contract involving bills and notes would exceed one hundred pages): A POLINSKY, supra 
note 4, at 29 (stating that cost of negotiations leads parties to ignore relatively unimportant 
contingencies) . 
.. A KRONMAN & R POSNER, supra note 13, at 4; A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at. 25 (char-
acterizing contract law as method for filling in missing terms parties find too costly to nego-
tiate themselves): Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract 
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88 (1977) (stating that all contracts incor-
porate such legal rules) • 
.. A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 25 & n.16 (presuming that parties would have bargained 
cooperatively); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 88 (identifying one purpose of con-
tract law as supplying terms parties probably would have adopted explicitly through 
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presumably, would have negotiated efficient terms.24 Presumably, 
any inefficient default rule would be negated through negotiation.2G 
The paradigm of the efficient contract, thus, is a contract that 
contains two types of terms. The first type is the product of a vol-
untary bargain, which the parties believe to be in their individual 
self-interest. The second type is governmentally created to reflect a 
hypothesized negotiated bargaining process and is supplied by con-
tract law when the parties either do not decide on a particular is-
sue or affirmatively choose to use the default rules. 
2. Nonenforcement of Negotiated Contracts. Not all negotiated 
contracts, however, are actually efficient. Because the paradigm 
rests on the assumption that the parties are knowledgeable and ra-
tional, problems arise, for example, with contracts entered into by 
minors or persons who are mentally incompetent.26 The economic 
justification for nonenforcement of these contracts is that these 
parties are "incapable of judging their self-interest," and "[i]f 
someone cannot judge what is in his self-interest, there is no pre-
sumption that the contracts he makes increase value. "27 
The protection for minors is premised on the assumption that 
negotiation). 
24 Because a more efficient exchange leads to a larger potential profit, the parties would 
presumably negotiate efficient terms. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 89. This pre-
sumption, however, may not hold in all cases. Assume A is a knowledgeable seller fully 
aware of a particular risk and B is an ignorant buyer. If the risk would more efficiently be 
allocated to A, an allocation to B would result in an inefficient contract. Since A is the only 
party to know of the risk, A could place the risk on B at no cost to A. A might thus be able 
to receive 100% of the benefit from a small, inefficient pie, but only, say, 50% of a larger, 
efficient pie. If the size of the increase does not make up for the loss A suffers by sharing, 
the larger pie will not result in larger profits for A. Hence, A may well prefer the inefficient 
solution. 
2' A KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 6; Schwartz, Proposals lor Products Lia-
bility Relorm: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1988). This principle follows 
from the Coase theorem: given perfect information and zero transaction costs, parties will 
achieve efficient results despite an inefficient rule of law, by one party paying the other a 
sum less than the cost of the inefficiency. Coase, supra note 18, at 8. 
28 C/. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14-15 (1979). Contracts entered into by 
minors are dealt with by § 14 (minors "have the capacity to incur only voidable contractual 
duties"). Section 15, addressing the problems inherent in contracting with mentally incom-
petent persons, reveals the policy behind allowing their contracts to be voidable: lOA person 
incurs only voidable contractual duties ... if by reason of mental illness or defect ••• he is 
unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequence of the transaction 
.... " Note that concerns of fairness and proper application of economic principles lead to 
the same result. 
27 R. 1>OSNER, supra note 1, at 80. 
1990] CONSUMER FORM CONTRACTS 589 
the young will be less likely to understand the consequences of a 
transaction, the nature of their true self-interest, and the eJo..'tent to 
which a particular transaction will serve that self-interest, even if 
properly identified.28 Of course, not all sane adults are capable of 
judging their self-interest either, and many minors do possess such 
ability. Nonetheless, in the interest of administrative convenience, 
age has been treated as a convenient criterion for determining 
those most likely to be unable to protect their self-interest in 
negotiations.29 . 
Other contracts that may not be enforced are those induced by 
deliberate dishonesty.3o A party misled as to the utility to be de-
rived from a proposed transaction cannot properly evaluate the 
true benefits and costs of the deal.31 The presumption that the 
agreement will lead to a value-increasing exchange, therefore, is 
rebutted.32 
Economic theory thus creates a model whereby efficiency is pro-
moted by the general enforcement of contracts. Individual and so-
cietal wealth are presumed maximized through the voluntary 
transactions of rational people, each pursuing his or her own self-
interest. In situations where people are incapable of judging 
whether a particular transaction will advance their self-interest, 
wealth maximization cannot be presumed and the contract will be 
voidable. 
B. The Paradigm of the Efficient Contract Term 
Under fundamental economic theory, contracting parties can de-
cide not only the value of a given good or service, but the value of 
28 A. KRONMAN & R POSNER, supra note 13, at 255. But see Epstein, supra note 13, at 301 
(stating that nonenforcement increases price or prevents contracting altogether by compe· 
tent children). 
29 A. KRONMAN & R POSNER, supra note 13, at 255; see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 300 
(stating that "it is quite likely that most, though not all, infants will be unable to protect 
their own interests in negotiation, even in transactions not vitiated by fraud"). 
00 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 298 (identifying fraudulent misrepresentation as com-
mon-law defense to a contract suit) . 
.. See generally Kronman, Mistake Disclosure, In/or11UJtion and the Law 0/ Contracts, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) (discussing in part effects of mistaken beliefs concerning a good or 
service). 
32 R POSNER, supra note 1, at 80. Because the cost of uncovering misrepresentation is a 
"deadweight social loss," nonenforcement of this type of contract serves a salutary purpose 
by discouraging such conduct. Id. at 79, 82. 
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individual contract clauses.33 Returning to the example of the con~ 
sumer purchasing the tractor, let us assume contract negotiations 
occur between two parties with perfect knowledge of both the 
physical characteristics of the tractor and the significance of the 
legal terms used in the contract.34 Assume, additionally, that there 
is a competitive market in long-run equilibrium, so that the total 
price equals the seller's cost.35 This competitive price is the only 
efficient price, because only those who value the good more than it 
costs the seller will make the purchase.36 There is no need for gov~ 
ernment regulation of the truly competitive market, because the 
market will generate the price that is utility-maximizing for 
consumers.37 
This model works for contract terms other than price as well. 
Once again, let A own a tractor worth $100 to her but worth $150 
to B. A proposes a sale price of $135, payable at $45 a year for four 
years.38 The contract A offers contains one extra provision, an 
"add-on" clause, that permits the seller to repossess not only the 
tractor but all items previously sold by the seller to the buyer if a 
single payment is missed.39 
In order for B to decide whether the sale would increase his net 
wealth, he will have to evaluate the "price" to him of this contract 
provision. Because of his perfect knowledge, he is able to under~ 
stand, at no additional cost, the legal significance of the clause; B 
.. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 25, at 373 (noting that in some consumer contract situa· 
tions, consumers will shop around for contract clauses that reflect their preferences). 
3' See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 636 n.105 (stating that "reasonable person" en-
visioned in contract law must have knowledge of the law). 
3. A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 85-87. Generally, a competitive market means that there 
are many firms offering the same commodity, so th'at no one seller has control over price. If 
a market is in long-run equilibrium (that is, all firms who wish to be in the market are In, 
and all who wish to be out are gone), price equals cost. When price exceeds cost, the excess 
profits will draw in new sellers, and when price is less than cost, some sellers will leave the 
market. When "cost" is used in this context, it includes return on investment as well as the 
cost of production. Similarly, "price" includes the present value of the sale price plus the 
expected present value of money paid due to contract clauses. Id. 
3. Id. at 87. 
37 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 668. 
3. For simplicity's sake, we can ignore both the interest cost and the time value of money 
in considering the value of the sale price. 
3. For one court's treatment of such an add-on clause, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding sales contract with add·on clause un-
conscionable and, therefore, unenforceable); see also infra text accompanying notes 157-59. 
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may then ascertain its present value.40 The higher the cost of the 
provision to B, the lower the price B will be willing to pay towards 
the purchase.41 
Most contract provisions serve to allocate risks between the con-
tracting parties.42 To an economist, "risk" is a known probability 
that an unfavorable outcome will occur.43 The cost of any contract 
provision to B is essentially the value of a particular risk being 
placed on A, or the cost to B of having to bear that risk himself. 
This cost can be evaluated as the probability of the loss occurring 
multiplied by the magnitude of the loss that would be suffered if 
the risk materializes.44 Both of these factors must be known in or-
der for a contracting party to make a rational decision. Because we 
have assumed that A and B possess perfect knowledge, we can as-
sume that they know both of these factors as well as the way that 
the contract clause will shift the risk. 
The cost of the add-on clause to B is, therefore, the probability 
that the risk represented by the clause will be realized, multiplied 
by the loss B will suffer in that event. The risk represented by this 
clause can be defined as the probability that both of the following 
will occur: (1) that B will miss a payment, and (2) that A will re-
possess all previously purchased items. The loss that B may suffer 
because of the add-on clause is the difference between (1) the 
amount of loss suffered by the repossession of all previously pur-
chased items, including loss of use and cost of replacement, and (2) 
the amount of loss that would be suffered from repossession of 
only the tractor, plus costs associated with a court action for the 
difference between the amount of outstanding debt and the pre-
sent value of the tractor.45 
•• See, e.g., Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 81 (stating that consumer considering 
purchasing durable good, "essentially compares the discounted value of the expected future 
service stream with the discounted value of the price and repair costs") • 
.. [d . 
.. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 88 (stating that fundamental purpose of con-
tracts is allocation of those risks created by noninstantaneous transactions) • 
.. Seita, supra note 14, at 81. While "risk" is measurable, "uncertainty" is an unknown 
probability of loss, and is unmeasurable and uninsurable. [d. A similar distinction can be 
drawn between "predictive error" and a "genuine mistake." The former occurs because it. is 
not cost justified to increase knowledge in order to avoid the error. A mistake, on the other 
hand, occurs even though the uncertainty is curable at a reasonable cost. Kronman, supra 
note 31, at 2 n.1 (1978) . 
.. Seita, supra note 14, at 82 . 
•• Mathematically, the cost of the add-on clause can be represented as follows. C = R x L 
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The add-on clause can also be viewed as a provision of value to 
A. The clause may compensate for the loss in value of the last-
purchased item by increasing the collateral available to the seller.40 
Thus, the cost to A of providing financing will be decreased; this 
savings may also be passed on to the buyer.47 
Returning to the proposed tractor sale, because B values the 
tractor at $150 and the proposed sale price is $135, if the cost to B 
of the add-on clause is less than $15, the exchange will increase his 
total utility and he will sign the contract. If the cost exceeds $15, 
however, he would be paying more than the tractor is worth to him 
where C is the cost to B of the clause; R is the risk involved; and L is the loss that will be 
suffered by B if the risk occurs. R = P1 X P2, where P1 represents the probability that B will 
miss a payment and P2 is the probability that A will repossess all previously purchased 
items. Let L1 be the loss suffered from a repossession of all previously purchased items, 
including loss of use and cost of replacement. Then let L2 represent the 103s to B from 
repossession of only the tractor and La equal the court costs and damages award associated 
with a legal action to recover the difference between the value of the tractor and the out-
standing debt. The value of La must be discounted by the probability that legal action will 
be brought and by the probability of the seller's success (which may be reduced, for OXam-
pie, if the tractor is defective and the buyer has a valid counterclaim). Thus, L = Ll - (L2 
+ La)· 
•• See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 86-87. Posner notes that if the seller did not include 
any term allowing add-on repossession in the contract, a default occurring early in the term 
of the contract would probably confer a loss on the seller as the payments he would have 
received would most likely not cover the depreciation of the single item. Id. If the sellor is 
required by law to return to the buyer all gain from repossession that exceeds the value of 
the money owed, plus interests and costs, the seller would not be gaining a windfall, but 
would merely be collecting that to which he is entitled. Epstein, supra note 13, at 307-08. 
41 R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 87 (explaining that, without add· on clause, seller would be 
forced to either increase size of the downpayment required or increase amount of payments 
due early in repayment schedule). 
The actual value of the add-on clause will also be affected by whether the parties are 
"risk-neutral," "risk-averse" or "risk-seeking." Parties are risk-neutral if they only care 
about the "expected value" of a future occurrence, that is, the magnitude of potential loss or 
gain multiplied by its probability. A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 27. Risk-aversion, repre-
sented by the purchase of insurance, occurs when a party accepts a lower expected value in 
exchange for a decreased probability of risk. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 91 
(identifying as risk-averse, people who would willingly pay substantial SUm to avoid uncer-
tainty of risk). Risk-seeking, as exemplified by the purchase of a lottery ticket, occurs when 
a party enters into a contract because of a desire for the potential gain, even though the 
expected value of that gain is less than the purchase price because of its small probability. 
See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 36. 
A party who is risk-averse will pay more to avoid a risk than a risk-neutral or risk-seeking 
party. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 91. Thus, the value to B of a contract without 
an add-on clause will be higher if B is risk-averse to the possibility of missing a payment on 
the tractor. Since the essential calculations are unaffected by these individual preferences, it 
is simpler to assume the parties are risk-neutral. 
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and, therefore, B will forego the deal..f8 If B is choosing between A 
and a second seller, C, and C offers a sale price of $140 without an 
add-on clause, a similar calculation is necessary. If the cost of the 
clause is less than $5 (the difference between A's and C's sale 
prices), B will sign the contract with A; if it exceeds $5, B will buy 
from C.49 
Therefore, in an efficient market with perfectly informed parties, 
an add-on clause may well be good for ~he purchaser. Because it 
decreases the seller's costs, it may result in lower prices. Consum-
ers could then determine whether their savings exceeded the cost 
of the clause; if so, they would accept it willingly.GO 
In such a world, prohibiting the add-on clause would harm con-
sumers by raising prices and by depriving consumers of the right 
to elect to pay a lower price for a less favorable contract.G1 Such a 
prohibition would also impair efficiency by forcing the use of a 
more inefficient credit arrangement and by preventing the parties 
from negotiating the optimal deal for each. G2 
In theory, voluntary negotiations between knowledgeable and ra-
tional consumers tend to produce efficient contracts. Economic 
theory holds that general enforcement of these efficient contracts 
leads to wealth maximization for society and for individual parties. 
But this theory produces optimal results only when its simplifying 
assumptions approximate a given situation. When the special char-
acteristics of a given situation are not replicated by the model, 
inefficiency and unfairness result. 
4. For contract terms in general, an informed buyer will agree to a purchase if V> P + T, 
where V is the value to the buyer of the item to be purchased, P is the sale price and T is 
the aggregate cost of contract terms to the buyer . 
•• In a perfectly competitive market, the cost of the clause will be exactly the difference 
between A's and C's sale price, and the purchasing decision will depend on whether B is 
risk-averse to the possibility of default. 
00 A prospective purchaser would discount the savings resulting from the presence of the 
add-on clause by his individual risk aversion. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 91. 
See also supra note 47. 
Gl See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 667 • 
•• See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 309. Epstein believes that, because the sale of the 
loan with a waiver-of-defense clause to a third party is efficient, raising the cost of such sale 
to third parties will force sellers to less efficient forms of purchase arrangements, such as 
cash sales. Id. See generally R POSNER, supra note 1, at 87. 
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II. AN ECONOMIC PORTRAIT OF CONSUMER FORM CONTRACTS 
Although fundamental economic principles lead to a conclusion 
that contracts that are entered into voluntarily will tend to be effi-
cient, the assumptions underlying those principles must be reex-
amined for consumer form contracts. Creation of these contracts 
differs dramatically from the classic paradigm. Significant factors, 
the most important being the lack of consumer knowledge as to 
many contract terms, must be added to the basic model so that an 
accurate economic analysis may be performed. 
A. Definition of the Consumer Form Contract 
The standard form contract is the most common type of contract 
entered into by consumers.1S3 Generally, these contracts are offered 
on a "take-it-or-Ieave-it" basis, with the purchaser prese,nting the 
consumer with a preprinted form detailing the obligations of both 
parties.1S4 Form contracts can benefit both consumers and sellers by 
reducing the cost of negotiation and by limiting the time each 
party has to spend on bargaining. ISIS One complaint frequently 
raised about standard form contracts, however, is that, because 
these contracts are not subject to negotiation, consumers generally 
will be worse off because of their use.ISS The term "contract of ad-
hesion"1S7 is often used to describe these agreements as consumers 
are forced to "adhere" to the terms as drafted by the seller. Com-
mentators have argued that the resulting contracts are likely to 
contain unreasonable terms because consumers do not "dicker" 
over most of these terms, ISS and "have no reasonable choice but to 
GO See Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (estimating that 99% of all consumer contracts are stan· 
dard form contracts) . 
•• See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 84·85. 
M See id. at 85; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 88; Seita, supra note 14, at 136. 
M See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom to Can· 
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943). 
G7 The term "adhesion contract" is taken from a French author, Raymond Saleilles, who 
used it to describe certain contracts "in which a single will is exclusively predominant, act· 
ing as a unilateral will which dictates its law, no longer to an individual, but to an indeter· 
minate collectivity." R. SALEILLES. DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE, sec. 89, at 229·30 
(1901), translated in Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 (1964) . 
.. K. LLEWELLYN. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960). 
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make the contract."1i9 
The lack of ability to negotiate, however, does not make the 
form contract per se unfair or inefficient. When a person purchases 
a newspaper at a newsstand, there is no negotiation with the dealer 
over the price to be charged. The ·paper is offered on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis. Similarly, a shopper filling his basket with groceries 
at the supermarket is not usually given the opportunity to negoti-
ate over the ripeness of a melon or the Jength of time a gallon of 
milk will keep. Nonetheless, consumers are well able to determine 
the subjective value of such purchases and can find a different 
seller, or forego a particular purchase altogether, if the deal is not 
perceived to be in their best interest.60 Accordingly, the presump-
tion that resources will move towards their most valued use re-
mains sound, even in these nonnegotiated transactions. 
The characteristic of form contracts that raises the greatest con-
cern for efficiency is not, therefore, that they are offered on a take-
it-or-Ieave-it basis. Rather, inefficient transactions occur because 
consumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the 
terms, and are thus unaware of their contents.61 Moreover, the 
businesses that draft these contracts do so knowing that they will 
not be read by the typical consumer.62 
Of course, consumers are usually aware of certain contract terms. 
They generally understand the central terms, such as price, but do 
not know of or do not understand many subordinate terms.63 Cer-
tainly, the typical borrower knows who the creditor is, how much is 
be~g borrowed, the amount and duration of monthly payments 
and, perhaps, such items as what is serving as collateral.04 Typical 
•• Slawson, supra note 53, at 549-50; see also Kessler, supra note 56, at 632 (arguing that 
consumers are not generally able to shop around because either contract drafter has monop-
oly or all competitors use same clauses). But see Schwartz, supra note 25, at 373 (suggesting 
that in certain situations consumers may be able to shop around Cor clauses). 
eo See, e.g., R POSNER, supra note I, at 85. 
61 See, e.g., Murray, The Standardizing Agreement Phenomena in the REsTATEMEh'T 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 750-51 (19S2) (assuming that even 
businesspeople may not read printed forms they exchange); Seits, supra note 14, at 133 • 
•• Seita, supra note 14, at 133 . 
.. The distinction between "central" and "subordinate" terms is taken Crom Priest. A 
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1304-06 (19S1). This is simi-
lar to Llewellyn's distinction between the "few dickered terms" and the remainder oC the 
form contract's "boiler-plate clauses." K LLEWELLYN, supra note 58, at 370. 
M This is likely true in the case of a homeowner seeking a second mortgage. But ct. Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) {uneducated consumer 
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borrowers, however, do not know the range of collection remedies 
available to the creditor, the myriad events that could trigger fore-
closure, or that they must pay the creditor's legal fees for collec-
tion procedures, but cannot recover their own fees even if they are 
successful in litigation.65 
B. The Inevitability of Imperfect Consumer Knowledge 
1. Effects of High Information and Transaction Costs. The sim-
plified classical economic model of contracts does not reflect the 
real world of consumers and the "special case"66 of standard form 
contracts. The most important complexity that must be added to 
the simple classical model is the inevitable consumer ignorance of 
subordinate contract provisions. While information can never be 
perfect,67 it is particularly inappropriate to make an assumption of 
perfect consumer knowledge.68 Even though consumers may know 
many of the characteristics of frequently purchased products,OD 
they will remain ignorant of the characteristics of contract terms 
which typical experience does not reveal. 
Economists have divided product attributes into three catego-
ries: (1) search qualities, such as the color of a car, that can be 
discovered before purchase; (2) experience qualities, such as the 
taste of tuna fish in a can, that are discoverable only after 
purchase; and (3) credence qualities, such as the quality of legal 
services rendered, that are difficult to evaluate even after normal 
use.70 The distinction between the three categories is essentially 
presumably did not know of add-on clause that provided that each item previously pur-
chased would be security for each additional purchase). 
6. Kerr, Mastering the Mystery of Fine Print, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6. 1983. § 3. p. 19. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. Of course, while consumer ignorance of 
subordinate terms is a "special case" in the world of contract law. it is the general case for 
consumer form contracts. 
67 See, e.g., Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation 0/ Consumer Information. 
24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 500 (1981) (stating that information is costly, and that perfect informa-
tion is neither "feasible nor desirable"): Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17. at 630 (stating 
that, because information is never perfect, task for economists is to figure out how to deal 
with world that lies somewhere between perfect information and perfect ignorance). 
68 A POLINSKY. supra note 4, at 97-98. 
69 See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 81-83 (implying that consumers can ascertain certain 
characteristics about products more easily after frequent use): Epstein. supra note 13. at 
304-05. 
70 See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (describ-
ing distinction between search and experience attributes); Darby & Karni. supra note 18. at 
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the cost of discovering relevant information. Search qualities can 
be discovered at relatively low cost prior to purchase, and many 
experience qualities can be ascertained at little or no cost soon af-
ter purchase. An experience quality that is not detectable for a 
long time or without great expense is essentially a credence qual-
ity, and consumers are not reasonably expected to discover these 
attributes.71 
These categories typically have been used in determining when 
fraud and deception are most likely to occur.'l2 Because a consumer 
will learn of any deception involving a search characteristic before 
purchase, sellers usually will not try to deceive consumers about 
such attributes.'l3 Similarly, a consumer will learn quickly after 
purchase whether claims about most experience attributes are ac-
curate and, if they are not, the consumer will not buy the product 
again. Thus, deception as to these experience attributes can be ex-
pected only by those not seeking repeat customers, such as sellers 
in the tourist trade or in fly-by-night operations.74 Deception is, 
therefore, most likely to involve credence qualities, or experience 
qualities of infrequently purchased goods.'ll! 
The typical consumer form contract does not involve fraud or 
deception; Nonetheless, the above categories are useful for deter-
mining the cost to the consumer of acquiring information neces-
sary to evaluate a purchase properly. Some central contract terms 
are similar to search qualities, because consumers can learn of 
them easily prior to purchase. The price and item being purchased 
are examples of this category. Most subordinate terms, on the 
other hand, are equivalent to credence attributes, since they will 
not be known to the typical consumer even after repeated 
purchases. Most often, these subordinate terms serve to shift risks 
away from the seller and on to the consumer. 
Subordinate terms will not be known because the cost of acquir-
in.g the necessary information exceeds the expected gain to the 
68-69 (adding concept of credence attributes). See generally Craswell, supra note 18, at 721-
22. 
71 Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 69. 
"Z2 E.g., Craswell, supra note 18, at 720-22; Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 68-69. 
7. Craswell, supra note 18, at 720 • 
.. [d. at 721. 
,. [d. at 721-22. 
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consumer from that information.76 The first cost of acquiring infor-
mation concerning contract terms is the time the consumer must 
spend reading the document. Because of the immense number of 
form contracts the typical consumer encounters, the cumulative 
time investment would be considerable. Some sellers attempt to 
increase this cost through the use of fine print or obscure place-
ment." Even without these additional obstacles, the sheer number 
of terms to be analyzed in the typical form contract imposes too 
great a burden for the consumer. 
The cost to the consumer is made all the more excessive by the 
high cost of understanding a term's legal significance.78 Again, 
some sellers try to increase this cost by hiding the term's meaning 
in obscure "legalese." Even with so-called "plain language" con-
tracts, costly research is generally required to understand the legal 
effect of a particular term.79 Obviously, consumers will not be able 
to undertake such research for every form they sign.80 
Neither is it economically viable for consumers to hire experts to 
interpret these documents. A consumer will only purchase the ser-
vices of an attorney if the expected loss from not understanding 
•• See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 643. Schwartz and Wilde describe tho officient 
search strategy as continuing until the marginal cost of further searching exceeds tho margi-
nal gain. That is, the efficient search stops when the cost of the next step in the search 
process exceeds a sum that is the product of the likelihood that the next step will reveal a 
better price, multiplied by the amount of savings. [d. 
.. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 85·86 . 
• 8 Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 667·68 (1986) (stating that legal knowledge is imperfect be-
cause legal research is costly and human cognitive capacity is limited) . 
•• Ellickson discovered that even when nonlawyers have some general understanding of 
their legal rights, they view the law in simplistic black and white terms with one side or the 
other having all the rights, rather than recognizing the coexisting rights of each party. [d. at 
669·70. 
80 In this respect, the contract terms closely resemble a credence attribute. See text ac-
companying note 70. A consumer cannot fully evaluate the quality of repair of an automo· 
bile "since he is unfamiliar with the intricacies and peculiarities of the particular machine." 
Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 69. Similarly, consumers are unfamiliar with "the intrica-
cies and peculiarities" of contract law. Although some consumers will have a basic under-
standing of common contract terms that appear freqUently, such as "warranty," Schwartz, 
supra note 25, at 372 n.36, they will not necessarily understand crucial related concepts 
such as limitation of remedy. See, e.g., Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 693 P.2d 
1308 (1979). In Mieske, the plaintiff took film detailing the history of her family to be devel-
oped and told the camera store, "Don't lose these. They are my life." The store, of course, 
lost the film. The Court held that plaintiff's recovery was not limited by an undisclosed 
contract clause that purported to limit any recovery to the cost of the film. 
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the contract exceeds the cost of legal advice.81 For most consumer 
purchases other than a house, the cost of legal advice will far ex-
ceed the expected value of the gain to be derived. 
By contrast, it will almost always be cost-justified for the busi-
ness drafting the contract to pay for legal advice. The aggregate 
value to the business of the potential profit from each individual 
transaction justifies the expense.82 Thus, only one party in the typ-
ical consumer transaction, the business seller, will have the neces-
sary legal knowledge to evaluate contract terms.83 
Without legal advice, consumers cannot understand how typical 
contract terms shift risks away from the seller and onto the con-
sumer. Further, consumers will also generally be at a disadvantage 
in determining the probability and magnitude of the loss that 
might result from a risk imposed by the seller. The high volume of 
sales by the typical business will make the risks to it reasonably 
predictable and, thus, insurable.84 Because most contracts do not 
result in any loss to consumers, and because consumers lack knowl-
edge about the likelihood of any particular loss, consumers tend to 
treat the risk as too insubstantial to protect against; therefore, 
they do not read the contract, let alone attempt to negotiate 
terms.8t1 
Whatever benefit might be derived by the consumer who accu-
rately understands a contract term must be further discounted by 
the high transaction costs of altering the term or finding a seller 
with a preferred term.88 The informed consumer knows that the 
81 See Seita, supra note 14, at 135. This calculation ignores the possibility that the legal 
experts hired may not understand the law fully. See generally Ellickson, supra note 78, at 
670-71. 
a. Seita, supra note 14, at 138. 
as Not only will the benefit to be obtained from correctly understanding a specific con-
tra.ct clause be far greater for the seller than the consumer, the seller's cost of ascertaining 
the information will be far less. This is because the marginal cost to the seller, above the 
cost for drafting the contract, will be small The marginal cost to the consumer of hiring a 
lawyer, in contrast, will be considerable . 
.. Seita, supra note 14, at 139 . 
.. See id. at 132-35. This lack of effort is rational: "Because the vast majority of contracts 
are successfully completed, a reasonable consumer should pay little attention to the terms of 
a contract unless he values the contract highly or is alerted to potential problems." ld. at 
133. See also Murray, supra note 61, at 740 (stating that "the pain and suffering of attempt· 
ing to read and understand every printed form would be greater than the pain [suffered] as 
a result of occasionally being bound by unread and uncomprehended printed terms"). • 
86 See Coase, supra note 18, at 15 (stating that cost of market transactions includes dis· 
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seller probably will refuse to bargain. First, most salespeople and 
clerks, the only representatives of the seller whom the buyer may 
find accessible, are not authorized to change a standard contract 
term. Second, the cost to the seller of making a special contract for 
one consumer will usually exceed the gain to be made by retaining 
that consumer as a purchaser.87 Thus, the rational seller will prefer 
to risk losing a single customer to losing the cost savings of stan-
dardized forms.88 
While a consumer theoretically could use the knowledge of the 
contract term to find a different seller with a preferred term, locat-
ing any new seller imposes significant additional transaction 
costs.89 If most businesses are using the same form, this cost of 
finding a new seller with the desired terms would be even higher.90 
In either case, these transaction costs are definite and substantial, 
and they usually will be greater than the uncertain expected gain 
to the consumer from the desired contract term. 
Thus, the benefit to be derived from acquiring adequate knowl-
edge of contract terms is usually low and is likely to be far ex-
ceeded by the significant costs of acquiring that information. It is, 
therefore, rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, 
if any, attention to subordinate contract terms. 
2. The Failure of the Market to Protect the Uninformed. In 
some instances of imperfect consumer information, generalized 
consumer knowledge may suffice to create a competitive market. 
For example, even before the Truth in Lending Act,91 consumers 
knew enough about market conditions to realize that most finance 
companies charged more than most banks.92 But for most terms 
used in typical consumer contracts, similarly useful generalized in-
formation does not exist. This is especially true of subordinate 
clauses involving unlikely contingencies. Moreover, without under-
standing each specific clause, consumers will be unable to ascertain 
covering parties with whom to deal, informing them of desire to deal, negotiating, and draw-
ing up contract) . 
•• Schwartz, supra note 25, at 371. 
88 Seita, supra note 14, at 142. 
•• See supra note 86. 
O. See Kessler, supra note 56, at 632 (arguing that consumers cannot shop around for 
preferred terms because competitors generally use similar contracts) • 
• , Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90·321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S. C.) . 
• 2 Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 681. 
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the true cost of a product or service. 
An alternate form of protecting the unknowing consumer is simi-
larly unavailable: the influence on the market of a minority of in-
formed consumers.9S If a large enough group of consumers is in-
formed, there may be a "pecuniary externality" protecting the 
uninformed.94 This protection will be derived from the competition 
of sellers for the marginal buyers who are informed and base their 
purchase decisions on this information.911 This protection-by-proxy, 
however, is not applicable to subordinate contract terms. While ad-
venturous consumers may research to find the best price, the far 
greater costs of searching for, reading, understanding and finally 
comparing the aggregate value of different sets of contract terms 
will overwhelm any benefit from doing SO.96 Further, this benefit 
must be discounted by the likelihood that the risks being allocated 
will never materialize.97 Thus, there generally will be too few in-
formed consumers to produce a competitive market for contract 
terms. 
A final way ignorant consumers may be informed is through 
competitive advertising.9s In some markets, a seller injured by a 
so Id. at 638. This has been described as the "public good" property of information. 
Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 67, at 503. 
\If Schwartz and Wilde suggest that if one third of the consumers in a market comparison 
shop, the market will behave competitively. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 652·55. 
s, Priest, supra note 63, at 1347 (recognizing that manufacturers may be forced to be 
responsive to small, informed group of consumers even though large majority ignore con· 
tract terms) . 
... See supra text accompanying notes 76·81. 
In Schwartz and Wilde say that other researchers have presumed that if consumers price 
shop, they will also be term-conscious, but have cited no support for this counter·intuitive 
presumption. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 660. In fact, Schwartz and Wilde propose 
that a market be considered at "monopoly equilibrium," and thus requiring government 
intervention, if: (a) the market is either not price competitive or fewer than one third of 
copsumers are term conscious; and (b) the contracts utilize fine print or arcane terminology. 
ld. at 661. It is unclear why the terms must be obscure in order to lead to a conclusion that 
competition over terms will not occur. If reasonable consumers do not read the contract and 
would not understand the significance of the legal concepts if they did, even the terms writ-
ten in the simplest English will not be subject to meaningful competition. See also Priest, 
supra note 63, at 1347 (suggesting that consumers influence subordinate warranty terms, 
such as exclusions from coverage, by indicating their preference, but admitting that there is 
no direct evidence as to how this preference is developed or communicated). 
98 See, e.g., Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framercork: A Comment, 17 J.L. & 
EcoN. 493, 495 (1974) (stating that if one firm lowers its price but reduces the value of its 
service more than the price savings, competitors will "have the strongest motives for inform-
ing consumers of the true state of affairs"); see also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 651 
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false or misleading claim of a competitor will determine that the 
benefit of correcting consumer misinformation exceeds the cost of 
the advertising.99 Such will not be the case with most subordinate 
contract terms. Most of these clauses allocate risks to the con-
sumer, such as the consequences of defaulting on payment and the 
possibility of a subsequent collection suit. Since consumers are, at 
best, only dimly aware of these risks, sellers will not want to call 
attention to the risks for fear of creating a disincentive for any 
purchase at all. lOO It is ludicrous to imagine a bank advertising, 
"We have the only loan contract in town that doesn't require you 
to pay our attorney's fees if we successfully sue you for default," or 
a manufacturer proclaiming on television, "We will sell your note 
to a collection agency, but, don't worry, you don't have to pay 
them if our product doesn't live up to its warranty." 
Additionally, consumers may lack the knowledge to evaluate this 
information even when it is given.lOI It will not be cost-effective for 
a firm to advertise all of its contract terms, especially when it will 
have to pay for educating the public as to the legal significance of 
each term. Moreover, comparative advertising may create free-
rider problems.l02 Because negative information about one compet-
itor's terms benefits the advertiser's other competitors, the incen-
tive for one firm to provide this information may be limited. loa Fi-
nally, because the expected cost of these risks to consumers is 
small compared to the other costs and benefits of the purchase,104 
sellers will not want to divert their limited advertising budgets to 
publicizing factors that will play at most a minimal role in 
purchasing decisions. 
Thus, consumers signing standard form contracts will generally 
not know the value of most of the contract terms either before or 
after purchase. The normal competitive pressures will neither force 
the disclosure of these terms nor create the externality of informed 
(stating that informative advertising produces competitive behavior). 
eo Craswell, supra note 18, at 720. 
100 See generally R POSNER, supra note I, at 136-37. 
101 Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 67, at 506 (stating that "consumers may underes-
timate the value of additional information simply because they lack other data that would 
tell them of their need to learn more"); see also supra text accompanying notes 76·81. 
102 Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 67, at 503-04 (discussing possible solutions to 
free-rider problem). 
'.3 Id. 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 76-89. 
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consumers protecting the uninformed majority. 
C. The Effects of Consumers' Imperfect Knowledge 
The consumer's substantial lack of information alters the as-
sumption that free choice will inevitably lead to an efficient re-
sult.105 When one party to a contract lacks sufficient information to 
determine whether a given transaction is wealth-maximizing, and 
the market does not supply this needed information, there can be 
no certainty that the transaction will increase that party's 
wealth.lOS In the case of consumer form contracts, there is actually 
a tendency towards inefficiency. 
1. Consumer Preference for Inefficiency. The lack of information 
will produce two specific tendencies in the market, each causing a 
different kind of economic distortion. The first has been termed 
the "quantity effect" and occurs because consumers buy more than 
would be efficient. The second is the "quality effect" and occurs 
because sellers are forced by consumer ignorance to supply prod-
ucts of lower quality than they should be.107 
These effects have been well-established in the analysis of prod-
uct liability. lOS For example, the outcome under a negligence regi-
men is efficient only if consumers correctly perceive the risks in-
volved and, thus, the true price of the product.109 If consumers 
underestimate the risks associated with a product, they will under-
value its actual cost and buy too much.llo Quality is adversely af-
fected in these circumstances because uninformed consumers will 
not pay for improvements; sellers, therefore, face no inducement to 
10. Coleman, supra note 15, at 541. 
106 The lack of information, in other words, undermines the simplifying assumption of 
utility maximization. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
10'7 See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 376·78 (discussing impact of consumer ignorance on 
ac~eving adequate and appropriate levels of product safety); Shavell, Strict Liability versus 
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1980) (providing clear example of effect of consumer who 
incorrectly perceives risk). 
108 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 107, at 1; see also R POSNER, supra note 1, at 136-37 
(discussing quality effects on product safety under systems of strict liability, negligence and 
no liability). 
109 If consumers correctly understand the risks involved, they can ascertain the full price 
of an item as market price plus future accident losses. Shavell, supra note 107, at 4. 
110 Id. Conversely, if consumers overestimate the risk involved, they \vill overestimate the 
product's true cost and buy too little. Id. The seller, however, has an obvious incentive to 
correct the buyer's error if it involves overestimation of risk. There is no similar seller incen-
tive to correct undervaluation. 
604 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:583 
exercise the appropriate level of care.lll 
For standard form contracts, the quantity effect occurs when un-
informed consumers buy too much of a product or service because 
they have not accurately evaluated the cost of the risks involved.112 
This can be seen by returning to the example of the tractor, valued 
at $100 by seller A and $150 by buyer B, with a sale price of $135 
and a contract containing one subordinate term, an add-on clause. 
If the risk represented by that clause has a value of greater than 
$15, the transaction does not increase B's wealth and he should not 
make the purchase.11s If, however, B has not read the contract,114 
and incorrectly assumes that A would not be able to repossess all 
of his prior purchases if he missed a payment, he will disregard the 
cost of the clause. Even if that clause shifts risks to the buyer so 
that the cost of the contract to B exceeds its benefits, B will none-
theless accept the deal.11 1> 
While the hypothetical tractor contract had but one subordinate 
clause, most consumer contracts contain numerous subordinate 
clauses. If these clauses are not known to the consumer and the 
total' cost of these clauses exceeds the expected benefit from the 
transaction, consumers will enter into economically inefficient 
contracts. 116 
In some circumstances consumers may know the average or gen-
eral risk of a particular product.1l7 In that case, consumers would 
111 Id. at 5 (illustrating that consumer who underestimates need for added safety features 
will not willingly pay increased cost of those features). 
". See, e.g., A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 98-99; Seita, supra note 14, at 129. 
m See supra text accompanying note 48. 
,,4 For a discussion of why it would not be efficient for a consumer to read a standard 
form contract, see supra text accompanying notes 66-90. 
UG Even if the shift in risk is not so great as to cause the consumer's total contract costs 
to exceed the benefits, the consumer who unknowingly bears that risk transfers to tho sellor 
a portion of value the consumer expected to receive (part of the excess of value to the con-
sumer over total price paid). See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 17 (2d ed. 1980). 
,,8 A mathematical model can illustrate this situation. Let V be the value to tho buyer of 
the item to be purchased, P the sale price and T the aggregate cost of the subordinato 
contract terms, {T: T = TI + T2 + T3 .... } where T1, T2, and T3 represent the cost of 
each contract term. A contract will be efficient for a buyer when V> P + T. If, howevor, Tu 
represents the cost of unknown clauses that impose risks the buyer does not undorstand 
{ Tu: Tu = T2 + T3 .... } an inefficient purchasing decision will result whenever the 
cost of the unknown terms exceeds the net benefit of the contract to the bUyer, that is, 
whenever Tu> VE, where VE = V - (P + T). 
111 See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 107, at 5 (describing situation where customers know 
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purchase the correct amount. Nonetheless, the quality effect would 
still lead to the creation of inefficient contracts. Consumers who 
are unaware of risks will not seek or choose contracts that allocate 
those risks to the seller, even when the extra cost for shifting the 
risk is less than the savings to the consumer. us Because consumers 
are "price conscious" but not "term conscious," a lower price will 
increase demand, but better contract terms, which are n9t under-
stood, will not. us Thus, uninformed consumers will actually prefer 
an inefficient contract, with a lower stated price but higher actual 
cost, to a contract that efficiently allocated risks to the seller. 
2. Seller Preference for Inefficiency. Why would a seller draft an 
inefficient contract? Intuitively, any profit-maximizing business 
would prefer to shift a risk to the other party if it could do so at no 
additional cost.120 Because consumers lack the knowledge to evalu-
ate the cost of the risk, a rational seller will draft contract terms 
that shift risks to the consumer.l2l 
The incentive for inefficient contract terms is similar to the in-
centive for fraud.122 When there are substantial information costs 
associated with uncovering deception, fraud is more likely to oc-
cur.123 The marginal revenue from the fraud will likely exceed the 
marginal loss of revenue from the loss of business of dissatisfied 
customers.124 
"the risk presented by sellers as a group but do not have the ability to 'observe' the risk 
presented by sellers on an individual basis"). 
118 See, e.g., Seita, supra note 14, at 122 (stating that person who does not understand 
why premium is being charged will naturally prefer less expensive contract, even when it is 
cheaper to pay to avoid risk). 
119 See, e.g., Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 67, at 510 (stating that "the market-
place [channels] competition toward the more easily observable product attributes"); see 
also Seita, supra note 14, at 145 (stating that consumers will probably fail to realize when 
removal of detrimental contract clause is worth increased price). 
120 See, e.g., Seita, supra note 14, at 83, 12S. 
121 If a given risk has a cost to sellers of $10 if imposed on them, a seller would pay any 
sUlli less than $10 to have a buyer assume the risk. If buyers willllSSume the risk \\ithout 
any compensation because they are unaware of it, the rational seller would obviously place 
the risk on the consumer. 
12' Ct. supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing increased chance of presence 
of deception in contracts for infrequently purchased goods). 
123 Darby & Karni, supra note IS, at 72-75. 
12. See Darby & Karni, supra note IS, at 73-75. This can be illustrated through a simpli-
fied model, adapted from Darby and Karni. See id. Let To = present value of total profit 
from a customer for an honest repair shop; So = the price for honestly prescribed repair 
service; V = the present value of future profits from the customer's return business; and Co 
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Fraud is even more likely when the lack of consumer knowledge 
induces the consumer to purchase both an information service and 
the desired good or service from the same source.12G For example, 
the typical consumer purchases both the diagnosis of needed auto-
mobile repair (information) and the performance of the diagnosed 
repairs (desired service) from the same repair shop. A business 
selling only diagnosis results would have no incentive to inflate the 
need for repairs, since it would not profit from the extra work and 
might lose current and future business if the fraud were to be dis-
covered. By contrast, when the same entity provides both the in-
formation and repair services, there is a greater incentive to use 
the information service to increase profits from the repair service, 
through, for example, prescribing unnecessary work.126 
Similarly, a consumer signing a standard form contract is 
purchasing both an information service (essentially paying for legal 
advice by having the seller's attorney draft the contract) and a 
"product" (the terms of the contract). As long as the marginal rev-
enue from inserting an inefficient clause exceeds the marginal loss 
of business from its use, the seller will have an incentive to draft 
contract terms unfavorable to the consumer, even though these 
terms may not be efficient.127 The marginal loss of business from 
= cost to the honest repairer of providing the service. If Ro = the probability that a cus-
tomer will refuse a properly diagnosed service and Go = the probability that the customer 
will take future business elsewhere, the expected profit from a customer is: 
To = ([80 - Co] x [1 - ReD + V [1 - Go]. (1) 
If S1 = the price for the fraudulently diagnosed repairs, C1 = the cost to the repair shop of 
performing those unnecessary repairs, R 1 = the likelihood that a customer will refuse the 
fraudulently prescribed service, and G 1 = the likelihood that a customer will not return to a 
fraudulent repair shop, the expected increase in profit for a fraudulent repair shop, T1 cnn 
be described as: 
Tl = ([(81 - 80) - (C1 - Co)) x [1 - (R1 - Re))) + V [1 - (G1 - Go)]. (2) 
A business will engage in fraud when a marginal increase in SI (the amount of fraud) results 
in a marginal increase in T1 (the profit from fraud). 
Note that as (R1 - Ro) and (G1 - Go) decrease in value, Tl increases. That is, as the loss of 
present and future business from fraud decreases, the profit from such fraud increases. 
Therefore, when the high cost of discovery reduces the amount of fraud detected, and thus 
the amount of business deterred by the fraud, the profit from the fraud will be increased. 
12' Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 68-70. 
128 [d. 
127 The analysis is similar to that for the profitability of fraud. See supra note 124. Let To 
= the present value of total profit for a business using an efficient contract; Po = the price 
paid by the consumer both for the purchased goods or service and for placing risks (R1, Ra, 
and R3) on the seller; Co = cost to the seller of producing the goods or service, including the 
bearing of those risks; and V = the present value of future profits from the customer's 
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the discovery of an inefficient clause is probably even less than the 
marginal loss from the discovery of fraud, because there is not the 
same social opprobrium.128 As there will be only a minimal loss of 
future business resulting from the use of unknown subordinate 
clauses, the incentive to shift risks to consumers will be high. 
It has been argued that a seller with market power would not 
exploit customers with one-sided contracts, because a monopolist 
(or a group of conspiring businesses) would gain the greatest re-
turn from a contract with terms most responsive to consumer de-
mands, but with an increased price exceeding the marginal cost of 
supplying the preferred terms.129 Theoretically, such an arrange-
ment would maximize consumer demand, thereby maximizing the 
seller's profit. 
But there can be no consumer preference for subordinate terms 
return business. If Ro = the probability that a customer will refuse to accept the efficient 
contract and Go = the probability that the customer will take future business elsewhere, the 
expected profit from the efficient placement of risks is: 
To = ([Po - Col x [1 - ~]) + V [1 - Gol. (1) 
If PI = the price paid by the consumer for the purchased goods or service but \\ithout 
placing risks RI , R2• and R3 on the seller; CI = the cost to the seller of producing the goods 
or service, without bearing those risks; RI = the likelihood that a customer \\ill refuse the 
inefficient contract; and GI = the likelihood that a customer will not return to the business 
using the inefficient contract, then the expected increase in profit for a business using an 
inefficient contract, T I , can be described as: 
TI = ([(PI - Po) - (CI - Co)) x [1 - (RI - ~)]) + V [1 - (G1 - Go)]. (2) 
We can assume that CI < Co. because the seller's costs are lower under the inefficient con-
tract as risks are now being borne by the customer, and PI < Po. reflecting the lower cost, 
equation (2) can be rewritten as: 
TI = ([(Co - CI) + (Po - PI)] x [1 - (R1 - ~)]) + V [1 - (G1 - Gol]. (3) 
If PI = po. that is. if a seller using the inefficient contract does not lower prices (either 
because all sellers are using the same contract or because consumers are not aware of the 
risks they are bearing). then profit from the inefficient contract, T2 becomes: 
T2 = ({Co - CI) x [1 - (RI - ~)]) + V [1 - (GI - Gol]. (4) 
In both equations (3) and (4) the differences {Rl - ~> and {G1 - Go> will be either zero or 
very small, as consumers are unaware of the subordinate contract terms being changed. As 
the differences approach zero, the profits T] and T2 approach: 
TI = (Co - CI) + (Po - PI) (5) and T2 = Co - C1 (6) 
The profits from the inefficient contract, thus, become the savings to the seller from having 
risk borne by the buyer, less the decrease in sale price. if any. 
128 See generally Epstein, supra note 13, at 298. 
1.9 Priest. supra note 63, at 1321. Although the context of this analysis was a discussion of 
one-sided warranty terms, the reasoning would apply to all subordinate terms of a form 
contract. See also Schwartz, supra note 25, at 373. Professor Schwartz argues that if con-
sumers have a noticeable preference for a particular clause. sellers will exploit this prefer-
ence by providing the clause at a higher price. 
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that are unknown or not understood. ISO Therefore, the "preferred," 
presumably efficient, terms actually will have no effect on demand. 
Moreover, as even a monopolist must confront the reality that de-
mand declines as price increases, lSI the efficient contract with the 
higher price may result in reduced profits.132 
Similarly, if demand is not altered by a change to an inefficient 
contract,133 the quantity sold by our monopolist at a given price 
will be the same as it would be if the contract were efficient, but 
the cost of producing that quantity will be less because more risks 
are being borne by the consumer. Thus, there is more profit for the 
monopolist using an inefficient contract.lS' 
The lack of consumer knowledge, therefore, will cause consumers 
to purchase too many products and services with inefficient con-
tracts and encourage sellers to create form contracts that are ineffi-
cient. The next section describes how courts, through common-law 
adjudication, can interpret these contracts to enhance the 
probability of obtaining efficient results. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
When consumers do not know or understand subsidiary form 
contract terms, sellers have no incentive to create efficient form 
ISO See supra text accompanying note 118. 
131 In other words, the monopolist, like other sellers, must deal with a demand curve that 
slopes downward. See generally F. GLAHE & D. LEE. MICROECONOMICS § 2 (2d ed. 1989). 
132 Whether any gain at all might be realized to the monopolist because of the higher 
price would depend on the price elasticity of the monopolist's demand curve. See id. § 3·2, 
at 72-73. In other words, whether the decrease in demand would be more than offset by the 
higher price charged depends on the sensitivity to price changes of the seller's particular 
market. Id. However, any gain to the monopolist realized in this fashion is irrelevant. The 
monopolist could have realized that same incremental increase in profit by raising his prices 
without ever bothering to change to an efficient contract. Moreover, the increased price 
combined with the inefficient contract would increase profit even more, because the monop· 
olist would not have to bear the increased costs associated with the efficient terms. 
133 That is, if the demand curve does not shift to the left. Id. § 2-2, at 35-37. 
134 The monopolist's demand schedule is illustrated in the following graph, derived from 
Judge Posner. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 197-98. Let Co = the marginal cost for the seller 
using an efficient contract (for simplicity, treat marginal costs as constant and ignore fixed 
costs); Po = the price; qo = the quantity produced; and Do = the point on the demand 
curve when marginal revenue = marginal cost with the efficient contract. Let C1 "" tho 
seller's marginal cost with an inefficient contract; PI = the price; ql "" the quantity pro· 
duced; and D1 = the point on the demand curve when marginal revenue = marginal cost 
with the inefficient contract. 
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contracts.131> Because there is no knowing and voluntary assent to 
the subsidiary terms, there can be no presumption that the ex-
change is wealth-maximizing.136 The law can and should recognize 
that the "class" of consumers is incapable of judging the personal 
utility of form contract terms, because acquiring the necessary in-
formation is economically inefficient. The appropriate governmen-
tal response to excessive information search costs is to reduce 





Monopoly profit can be determined by calculating the area of rectangles PoDoq,;Co = Ao 
and PIDlqlCI = AI' If the cost savings exceed the price reduction (if any) with the ineffi-
cient contract, then Co - C, ;::: Po - Pl. Therefore, Al > Ao and the monopolist \\ill earn 
greater profit with the inefficient contract. 
'30 See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 372 (stating that "no market can work well when 
consumers do not know what their contracts say"). 
'3. See A. KRONMAN & R POSNER, supra note 13, at 5 (noting thnt only contract that 
involves an actual meeting of the minds satisfies economist's definition of value·maximizing 
exchange). 
'37 See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 372-74. Although Professor Schwartz concludes that 
courts cannot reduce high search costs, the careful selection of rules for contract construc-
tion should be able to encourage behavior by sellers that will reduce consumers' search 
610 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:583 
ties, the courts then can properly proceed on the assumption that 
voluntary transactions are wealth maximizing. 
The concept that members of a class generally may be unable to 
protect their interests as contracting parties is not unknown to the 
law.138 For example, contracts entered into by minors are treated 
differently from other contracts because children, as a class, are 
deemed "incapable of judging their self-interest."l39 The law cre-
ates a broad category based on an easily identifiable criterion, mi-
nority, and operates on the plausible assumptions that most of 
those within this category require special protection, and that most 
of those outside the category do not.l4O Thus, the law provides that 
most contracts are voidable at the minor's election.l4l 
A similar argument can be made for the special treatment of 
consumers signing form contracts. As a class, consumers are inca-
pable of judging whether a given form contract contains hidden 
costs that will injure their self-interest.l42 While there may be that 
rare consumer who not only reads an entire form contract but also 
understands its legal and economic significance, the great majority 
of consumers do not. 
The re~edy for the existing lack of consumer knowledge, how-
ever, should not be the same as for minority: making the entire 
contract voidable at the election of the consumer is unnecessary. 
With adequate knowledge, adult consumers are presumed to be 
able to evaluate the economic value of a transaction to them. To 
correct the inherent lack of consumer knowledge, an efficient 
scheme for interpreting and enforcing form contracts would en-
courage the seller, with substantially lower information costs, to 
share critical information with consumers.143 Because the seller is 
costs. 
10. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text . 
... R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 80; see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 300 (noting that 
other specially treated classes include those with diminished capacity, such as insane or 
intoxicated persons). 
140 A. l~RONMAN &. R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 255. 
141 See supra note 26. 
142 This inability is due to the excessive information costs associated with discovering the 
meaning and effect of subsidiary contract terms. See s;~pra notes 76-85 and accompanying 
text. 
143 This is similar to the proposal by Kronman that there be a duty to disclose informa-
tion when such disclosure would not deter the deliberate search for information by the party 
with the least costly access to it. See Kronman, supra note 31, at 32-33. For example, con-
sumers purchasing life insurance have a duty to disclose health problems, because they are 
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better able to control the conveying of information, sellers who 
give incorrect or misleading information to consumers should be 
held liable for the error.144 Additionally, when information is not. 
shared, courts should construe the contract to approximate the 
subsidiary contract terms to which the consumer and seller would 
have agreed after informed negotiations. Wi 
The framework for enforcing consumer form contracts can be 
termed the "doctrine of reasonable expectations," with the focus 
on the reasonable expectations of the consumer. In some cases, the 
seller and buyer will have different expectations as to the subsidi-
ary terms of the contract.l"6 Sellers can discover the reasonable ex-
pectations of the consumer at far less cost than the reverse. It will 
likely be cost-justified for the seller, who engages in multiple simi-
lar transactions, to pay to ascertain this information, but it would 
not make economic sense for consumers to discover the expecta-
tions of sellers for each different purchase they make.I.e7 If the con-
sumer's reasonable expectations determine the terms of the con-
tract, the seller will be encouraged to' either ascertain those 
expectations or alter them by providing adequate information. 
Once both parties are operating under the same accurate assump-
tions as to the meaning and value of their contract, their consent 
can be presumed to indicate a value-maximizing transaction. 
the cheaper information-gatherers and would want to discover information as to their health 
regardless of disclosure requirements. ld. at 26-27. Similarly, the business that is drafting 
the contract will need to learn about the law and its requirements even if no disclosure rules 
exist. Additionally, it could be argued that, because a consumer is purchasing the contract, 
see supra text accompanying notes 125-28, as well as the desired goods or services, the seller 
should be held to a fiduciary's obligation to share the information. Cf. KrOIUllLlll, supra note 
31, at 18 n.49 (describing economic rationale for fiduciary's traditionally higher standard of 
disclosure). 
1 .. See infra text accompanying notes 161-73. 
1<0 See A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 25. In interpreting contracts a presumption arises 
that parties would have bargained cooperatively. ld. at 25 n.16. 
1<6 This will be true, for example, when there is a rational buyer expecting efficient con-
tract terms and a seller offering nonefficient terms, assuming that the buyer does not learn 
of the written contract provisions. It will also be true when a contract clause greatly differs 
from either a commonly used term or a common default rule generally utilized in similar 
transactions. If the consumer and seller have the same expectations, interpreting the agree-
ment to conform to the reasonable expectations of the consumer would obviously result in a 
contract that conforms to the seller's expectation as well 
1<7 This conclusion follows the analysis employed earlier to explain why businesses are 
willing to pay for legal advice in drafting form contracts, and consumers are not. See supra 
text accompanying note 81. 
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Although courts and commentators have used the concept of 
"reasonable expectations" before, usually no strict definition of 
how to determine what expectations are "reasonable" has been ar-
ticulated.H8 The benefit of a reasonableness standard is that it im-
plies that any expectations be objectively determinable. Because 
consumers are presumed to desire efficient contracts,149 reasonable-
ness can be determined by economic analysis, rather than, for ex-
ample, by a survey of consumers. 
The word "expectations" is used to encompass not only reasona-
ble "beliefs" derived from economic analysis of a transaction, but 
also beliefs that were created affirmatively by a particular seller.lllD 
Most important, consumers' expectations can be created through 
accurate information. The doctrine of reasonable expectations 
would enforce those form contract terms that are entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily by consumers with adequate 
information.151 
Under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the final contract, 
therefore, consists of three types of terms: those explicitly agreed 
to by both parties; those the seller led the consumer to believe 
would be in the contract; and those that would have been agreed to 
by each party after negotiation. Such a contract comes closer to 
the ideal of the agreement that is voluntarily entered into by par-
ties with perfect information than does the typical standard form 
contract as drafted. 
A. Explicit Consumer Assent to Known Terms 
Typically, consumers give explicit consent only to the central 
terms, such as price, in the standard form contract. till! A seller 
wishing to ensure the enforceability of a subordinate clause should 
be able to do so by adequately disclosing the meaning and effect of 
that clause. Merely using a contract with plain language and with-
148 See :Schwartz, supra note 25, at 385 (criticizing "consumer expectations test" as con· 
fusing, without standards and, at best, a synonym for cost/benefit analysis). 
149 See supra notes 12·13 and accompanying text. 
'00 See infra notes 161·73 and accompanying text. 
101 See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 358 (stating that default rules do not contravene ac-
tual assent because they are revocable). This framework may not be appropriate for situa· 
tions where monopoly power effectively precludes consumer's rejection of an inefficient con· 
tract, such as contract between consumer and utility company. See infra note 194. 
m See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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out fine print is not sufficient, even though such a contract would 
somewhat decrease the consumer's information costs. Those costs 
would still be so high that it would not be cost-efficient for con-
sumers to ascertain the existence, let alone value, of subordinate 
clauses.llSS A contract that is not read cannot indicate that a con-
sumer knew of a risk or agreed to a particular allocation. 1M 
To enforce a subsidiary clause, the seller would have to prove 
that the consumer was given actual knowledge of that clause. Re-
turning to the example of the add-on clause,11S1S the court should 
not enforce the clause unless it was adequately explained to the 
consumer at the time of purchase. Rather than simply including 
the clause in a contract that the seller knows will never be read, a 
seller would have to disclose the clause in such a manner that a 
buyer would be expected to understand its significance. 1 liS 
The classic case of Williams u. Walker-Thomas Furniture CO.11l7 
can be understood as judicial condemnation of the disparity of in-
formation between buyer and seller. The court refused to enforce 
an obtusely drafted add-on clausers stating that when a party 
"signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no 
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even 
an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the 
terms.mlS9 In contrast, it is hard to imagine that a court would re-
fuse to enforce the clause if the seller had actually said to the pur-
chaser prior to the signing of the contract, "Let me make sure you 
understand this clause. It means that until you've paid us all the 
money you owe for everything you've ever bought from us, we can 
1 .. See supra notes 76·80 and accompanying text. 
115< See Seita, supra note 14, at 132. 
1M See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text. 
1 .. The additional cost of such disclosure should not be prohibitive for most sellers. See 
infra text accompanying note 165. 
m 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
1 .. In Williams, 350 F.2d at 447, the contract stated, in part, "all payments now and 
hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and 
accounts due the Company by [purchaser] at the time each such payment is made." The 
court correctly categorized this as a "rather obscure provision." [d. The provision was 
designed to allow the seller to repossess all items previously purchased by the consumer, in 
the event of default. Id. 
109 Id. at 449 (emphasis added). The court also argued that the consumer was "a party of 
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice." [d. Because the subject of the transac-
tion was a stereo set, presumably a well-informed consumer would at least have the choice 
of accepting or foregoing the transaction. 
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take back everyone of those items if you miss even a single pay-
ment. Do you understand?" 
With such actual notice, the consumer could decide whether the 
next item to be purchased was worth the risk of losing all items 
previously purchased from the seller. ISO Since efficiency is only 
concerned with informed risk taking, not with whether a given 
gamble pays off, the consumer should have no valid complaint if 
she knowingly elects to take a chance that she will be unable to 
pay all her debt, and thereafter defaults and loses her previous 
purchases. 
B. Seller Statements and Advertisements 
Businesses that give misleading information to consumers shOUld 
be held to any promises they erroneously convey. In C & J Fertil-
izer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.rl the written burglary 
insurance contract limited coverage to burglaries resulting in "visi-
ble marks . . . upon, or physical damage to the exterior of the 
premises at the place of entry.mS2 The agent selling the insurance, 
however, had told the purchaser, prior to contracting, that there 
need only be "visible evidence of burglary.ms3 The court held that 
the consumer's reasonable expectations, as created by the agent's 
statement, should supersede the written language, so that recovery 
was permitted even though the exterior to the building was 
unmarked.ls4 
This decision is consistent with efficiency principles. It makes far 
more economic sense for the insurance company, which drafted the 
policy, to be required to explain it correctly to its agents than to 
expect the consumer, who has been told of a clause's purported 
meaning, to double-check the agent. The cost to the company 
which already has to inform its agents of the contract so as to per-
mit them to sell the policies is minimal. The benefit to a consumer 
of researching a provision previously explained by an agent is too 
.6. In this scenario, the informed consumer is able to evaluate the magnitude and 
probability of loss. See supra text accompanying notes 84·85. Consumers actually become 
better able to do so than the seller, as they can better judge the probability of defaulting, 
.6. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) . 
... Id. at 171. 
'6' Id. The agent had the authority to bind the insurance company. Id . 
• 6. Id. at 177. 
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small to justify the cost of doing SO.165 Moreover, insurance policies 
are not presented to consumers until after the contract has been 
created. Rational consumers eValuating the wisdom of a particular 
policy will rely on the agent's affirmations, because they cannot 
read the as yet unreceived policy. 
Reasonable expectations can also be created by advertise-
ments.lS6 In Collins u. Uniroyal/67 tire advertisements stated that 
a particular tire was guaranteed against blowouts and added, "If it 
only saves your life once, it's a bargain. "IS8 The court ignored a 
contract clause limiting damages to replacement and permitted a 
suit for damages when the consumer died from an accident caused 
by a blowout.169 Presuming that the buyer relied on the advertise-
ment and was unaware of the contract clause, this result is 
justified.170 
1 .. The benefit to the consumer is the value of the correct information discounted by the 
probability that the agent's information was correct. Because the high cost to a consumtlr of 
evaluating a contract term usually exceeds the value of correctly understanding the term, 
the cost here will easily exceed this discounted benefit. See supra notes 76·90 and accompa· 
nying text. 
166 It is not always simple to "interpret" an advertisement correctly, especially when no 
explicit promise is made as to the extent of the advertiser's liability for failure to perform. 
Nonetheless, because a false claim can inaccurately inflate the buyer's perceived value of a 
transaction, see infra text accompanying notes 171-72, advertised claims should not be ig-
nored. If an explicit promise is made in an advertisement, it should be presumed that the 
parties expected the application of the traditional contract remedy: that the seller would 
compensate the buyer for "any injury resulting from the failure to perform." R. POSNER, 
supra note I, at 88. An unread clause should not be permitted to overcome the presumption. 
Only an explicit limitation of liability to which the buyer has knowingly agreed can establish 
that the true value of the promise has been included in the buyer's perception of the value 
of the bargain. 
167 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974). 
168 ld. at 262·63, 315 A.2d at 18. 
1., ld. 
11. Collins has been condemned, in part, on the basis that the plaintiff' did not prove that 
the deceased consumer had relied upon the advertisement. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 
310·11. While it may be more efficient to require consumers, generally, to prove that they 
knew of and relied upon advertisers' statements, it would be rational to shift the burden in 
the case of a deceased consumer (especially when his inability to testify is caused by the 
defective advertised product). Falsely advertising the safety of a tire involves a credence 
characteristic; safety cannot be ascertained either before purchase, or at low cost after 
purchase. The seller's advertisement may be the only prepurchase information about safety 
available to the consumer. See Darby & Kami, supra note 18, at 69 (discussing credence 
qualities in context of fraud); see also supra text accompanying notes 70·71. Additionally, 
the aggregate consumer injury from faulty tires far exceeds the cost of correcting the adver-
tisement. Thus, the burden should be on the seller who conveyed misleading information to 
the public to prove that the advertisement did not affect the purchase decision of this par-
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To illustrate, assume that the buyer had the choice of buying 
two brands of tires.l7l All other things being equal, if Seller A's 
tires cost less, and only Seller B's advertisements conveyed a 
promise that the tire would save the purchaser's life, the buyer 
who chose to pay extra for the advertised tire did' so to receive a 
guaranty of safety. Since Seller B did not deliver the promised per-
formance, the consumer is entitled to receive a monetary 
equivalent of the loss directly attributable to that failure.1'12 To 
award the buyer only a refund on the purchase price would en-
courage sellers to inflate falsely the buyer's perceived value of a 
transaction, thereby causing inefficient transactions to occur.l'tll It 
may well be impossible (either technologically or economically) to 
manufacture "blowout-proof' tires, and the damages resulting 
from blowouts, if not limited to purchase price, may exceed the 
profits derived from the sale of the tires. In that case, sellers would 
be encouraged to refrain from overpromising the tires' capability, 
and consumers would be better able to determine the value of the 
tires to them. 
ticular deceased consumer. See generally Craswell, supra note 18, at 724·25 (discussing suits 
brought by Federal Trade Commission against sellers who used false or deceptive 
advertising). 
111 I will ignore, for simplicity's sake, the option of not buying tires altogether and choos· 
ing an alternate means of transportation. 
I •• This is similar to an award for medical malpractice against a physician who fails to 
treat patients with the expected level of care. See R. POSNER, supra note I, at 126·27. Like 
the doctor, the tire seller should be held to the customary level of care, except for the prom-
ise of additional care made in the advertisement. 
173 To see why, assume both Seller A and Seller B offer tires for sale worth $50; further 
assume that all the tires offer the same level of safety. While Seller A sells her tires for $50 
each, Seller B falsely advertises that her tires will definitely not cause the consumer's death 
and thus justifies her sales price of $65. The added $15 is the value of the promise to the 
consumer who buys from Seller B. Let Vb = the value of the consumer's life to the con-
sumer, and R = the risk to an average driver of a fatal blowout (from either A's or B's 
tires). Therefore, R x Vb = $15. If R = .01% and Seller B sells 10,000 tires, one fatal 
accident should occur. The resulting loss from that one accident is $150,000 (Vb = $15 + R 
= $15 -;- .01% = $150,000). If the predicted loss is $150,000, but the seller need only pay 
$65 in damages, consumers will buy too much of Seller B's tires. 
Moreover, sellers will have an incentive to advertise falsely since the value to a seller of 
the false claim exceeds the cost. Let V. be the increased profit, such that Vs = (incremental 
price increase) x (sales) = $15 x 10,000 = $150,000. The associated increased cost to the 
seller, Cs' is only $65 (the measure of liability to which the seller becomes exposed because 
of the false advertisement). Therefore, the profit from the deception is great: Vo • Co =0 
$150,000 - 65 = $ 149,935. Because long-term safety is a credence characteristic, see supra 
note 170, and deceased customers are not a good source of repeat business anyway, sellers 
will be strongly motivated to sell tires for more than they are actually worth. 
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C. Undisclosed Contract Terms 
1. The E/liciency-Based Default Clause. Under the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations, the final type of clause in a consumer 
form contract is essentially a default clause.1'1' It encompasses the 
parties' obligations when the seller has not adequately conveyed to 
the consumer the meaning and effect of a particular contract pro-
vision.175 The scope of these obligations can be ascertained byap-
plying the fundamental principle that parties negotiating freely 
will tend to allocate risks and responsibilities in a way that maxi-
mizes the contract's joint value to the contracting parties or mini-
mizes their joint costs.176 This goal is generally achieved by placing 
the risk of a given loss on the superior risk bearer.177 Such an allo-
cation creates an incentive for the more efficient risk bearer to 
adopt cost-justified risk avoidance or risk-minimization 
techniques.178 
The superior risk bearer is identified by determining which 
party is the superior insurer.179 First, the party with the lower 
measurement costs must be identified. This requires an evaluation 
of the costs of estimating both the probability and magnitude of a 
given 10SS.180 The second step is to determine who has the lower 
transaction costs. This is the party who would face lower costs in 
eliminating or reducing the risk, or in diversifying away the risk by 
pooling with other risks through self-insurance or market 
... See supra text accompanying notes 19-25. 
175 The economic guidelines discussed in this section obviously work equnily well in devel-
oping default terms that serve the simple "gap-filling" function-addres;ing consequences 
unforeseen by both parties to the contract. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
116 R POSNER, supra note 1, at 179. 
111 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 117. Posner and Rosenfield use this anniysis to 
discuss contracts that become unenforceable due to impossibility and related circumstances. 
They emphasize that no analysis of superior risk-bearing ability should be done if the con-
tract assigns a particular risk to one of the parties. ld. at 90. The authors concede, however, 
that a contract term will not reflect a true assignment of risk if, for emmple, the source or 
magnitude of a price change was not within the parties' contemplation. Id. at 94. Similarly, 
in the context of a standard form contract, the consumer who lacks knowledge of the risk 
allocated by a subsidiary term cannot be assumed to have contemplated that risk, or to have 
voluntarily assented to bear that risk, merely because the contract so states. 
178 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 113. 
179 R POSNER, supra note I, at 77; see also Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 91-92 
(discussing various factors relevant to evaluating which party is the cheaper insurer). 
180 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 9l. 
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insurance. lSI 
In the typical transaction involving a consumer form contract, 
sellers have the lower measurement costs because of their greater 
experience with the product or service gained through their high 
volume of sales.1S2 Just as a well-driller will be better able than the 
customer to estimate the probability of hitting a boulder/s3 the ex-
perienced business person will be better able than the typical con-
sumer to estimate the probability that a product will fail to per-
form. Of course, if there are special needs associated with a 
particular consumer, such as a purchaser who intends to use his 
family washing machine for commercial use eight hours a day, that 
consumer will likely have lower measurement costs. 1M 
The typical business will also have the lower transaction costs. 
Obviously, the business that drafted the agreement faces substan-
tially lower information costs in learning who is to bear a specific 
risk than the consumer. Therefore, the business seller will be bet-
ter able to act to reduce the risk at less cost.1SG Furthermore, as 
producer of the goods or supplier of the service, the business fre-
quently will be better able to prevent harms caused by poor qual-
ity goods or services, and to do so more cheaply than could the 
purchaser .lS6 
The business seller, therefore, is the superior insurer for most 
consumer goods and services. Moreover, the seller's high volume of 
transactions makes a given risk reasonably certain; with high 
enough sales, a manufacturer can predict the total number of de-
fects. ls7 The seller can then eliminate many risks through self-in-
181 [d. at 91-92. 
18. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
183 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 101 (discussing Hein v. Fox, 126 Mont. 
514, 254 P.2d 1076 (1953». 
184 Ct. Priest, supra note 63, at 1333 (noting that warranty protection may be denied 
when consumer does not use product in customary way; Curther, dominant group oC consum· 
ers, who do expect to use the product in usual way, may accept reduced warranty protection 
in exchange Cor lower price). 
18. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 31, at 4-5 (noting that court concerned with economic 
efficiency would impose risk on superior inCormation gatherer to reduce transaction costs of 
contract process); see also Seita, supra note 14, at 120-21. 
186 Ct. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 110-11 (stating that producing party is 
generally superior risk bearer because it is better able to estimate likelihood of an unfavora-
ble event and to prevent its occurrence). 
187 Seita, supra note 14, at 139-40. 
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surance, simply by charging all customers a higher price.IBB 
Risks should be borne by the consumer, however, when the con-
sumer is better able than the seller to avoid the loss. For example, 
the damage caused to a car by high-speed racing is a risk that the 
consumer could avoid more easily than could the seller of mass-
produced automobiles.189 In the typical consumer transaction, how-
ever, the seller is the superior bearer of many risks, and the effi-
cient default clause should place those risks on the seller. 
2. The Traditional Default Clause. An alternate, but perhaps 
equivalent, means for determining the consumer's reasonable ex-
pectations of undisclosed risk allocation is to apply traditional con-
tract default terms.190 Many of these default clauses are efficient, 
as they have been created by common law to approximate the re-
sult of cooperative bargaining.191 One example of an efficient de-
fault clause is the rule that any contract that requires a seller's 
performance to be "satisfactory" to the buyer is presumed to re-
quire that the buyer's rejection be objectively reasonable.192 In the 
words of Judge Posner, "The requirement of reasonableness is read 
into a contract not to protect the weaker party but to approximate 
what the parties would have expressly provided with respect to a 
contingency that they did not foresee, if they had foreseen it."J93 
In addition, reliance on traditional default terms reduces the un-
certainty of judicial involvement in contract interpretation. When 
courts begin to interpret form contracts other than explicitly as 
188 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 93; Seita, supra note 14, at 130. The seUer self-
insures by charging a price high enough to offset any losses caused by defects. 
189 Priest, supra note 63, at 1333. Many of the warranty exclusions discussed by ProffSS{lr 
Priest can be categorized as risks that should be borne by consumers because, in the posited 
situations, they are better able than the sellers to avoid the harm (such as damage to the 
enamel finish on an appliance or damage to automobiles caused by weather). Id. at 1329, 
1334. 
190 See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. RID'. 
1173, 1258·60 (1983) (stating that courts should presume that subsidiary or "invisible" 
clauses are unenforceable and, therefore, that "background law" of implied gap·fillers 
should be applied); see also Seita, supra note 14, at 122·32 (stating that "strong" default 
rules, based on strong justifications such as efficiency, should not be negated \\ithout ex-
plicit approval, while "weak" default rules, which make an essentially arbitrary risk n1Jcx:a-
tion, should be easily negated by the writing). 
191 See A POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 25. 
19' E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 556·59 (1982). 
193 Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(posner, J.). 
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written, sellers become uncertain about the scope of obligations to 
which they are already committed. If courts are free to ignore any 
clause they consider "inefficient," a seller cannot be confident that 
a court will always agree with its assessment of contract efficiency, 
A relatively simple principle, applying traditional default rules, 
gives a court fewer questions to resolve. This reduces the risk of 
judicial error and increases the seller's ability to predict eventual 
judicial outcomes. 
It is essential to remember that the contracting parties must al-
ways be permitted to agree upon an allocation of risk that a court 
might find to be inefficient. To enforce a particular clause, the 
seller should have to show only that the consumer was given actual 
knowledge of the allocation in such a way as to be able to evaluate 
the costs of that risk allocation.19' Consumers who are adequately 
informed about proposed contract terms can decide whether they 
wish to receive additional compensation for assuming a particular 
risk. Absent knowledge adequate for decisionmaking, consumers 
are deprived of return for the value they confer to the seller by 
"agreeing" to bear a risk. 
D. Reasonable Expectations and the Efficient Form Contract 
Despite the economic rationale for the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations, no claim can be made that the resulting system would 
ensure one hundred percent efficient results. It is axiomatic that 
government involvement in the marketplace is a second-best solu-
tion.1911 All governmental regulation of contracts imposes costs and 
risks of inefficiency and error and can only be justified when the 
gains from a regulation exceed its costs.196 Nonetheless, not all gov-
ernmental limits on absolute "freedom to contract" violate eco-
nomic principles. The Statute of Frauds, which bars enforcement 
10. This enforcement scheme should not apply when consumers have no choice about en· 
tering the contract, for that presents a "special case" not addressed by the model as offered 
here. See supra text accompanying notes 7·11. For example, assume that an electric com· 
pany contract states that consumers must pay all of the company's legal fees in an action 
against the consumer, even if the consumer wins the case. Such a clause should not be en· 
forced regardless of the "consent" of the consumer. ct. D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 87 
Misc. 2d 657, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (finding that applicant to law school 
has no choice but to accept contract provided by those operating Law School Admissions 
Test). 
,.. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, at 679. 
,.. Craswell, supra note 18, at 726; Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 83. 
1990] CONSUMER FORM CONTRACTS 621 
of certain oral contracts, promotes efficiency by reducing the risks 
of oral transactions and thereby reducing the cost of contracting.l97 
Similarly, the doctrine of reasonable expectations promotes effi-
ciency by reducing the costs associated with inadequate under-
standing of contractual risks and obligations. ISS The alternative to 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is not a system of market 
decisions based on perfect information but, rather, one of transac-
tions in which one party is ignorant of ~ost of the contract terms. 
If standard form contracts are only enforced precisely as written, 
drafters would be able to insert inefficient clauses that they know 
consumers do not expect, desire or learn about prior to signing. 
Just as a contract containing a unilateral error known to one party 
should not be enforced against the other/ss it is economically irra-
tional to enforce against the uninformed consumer standard con-
tract clauses known only to the seller. In both instances, courts 
should not encourage the reliance of the informed party on the 
known misunderstanding of the other, especially if that misunder-
standing can be easily rectified before the contract is signed.20o 
Undoubtedly, some subsidiary contract terms will be more costly 
to explain than others, in terms of time and the training of em-
ployees. Such explanation, though, is only required for inefficient 
terms; written contract terms that allocate risks efficiently need 
not be specifically disclosed to be enforced.201 Even assuming occa-
197 A. KRONMAN & R POSNER, supra note 13, at 253. 
19. The doctrine, therefore, compensates for the excessive information and transaction 
costs faced by consumers. C/. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 98 (stating that eco-
nomics-based contract discharge rules should be limited to contingencies not provided for in 
contract, since choice in contract must be the more efficient one, "subject to information 
and transaction costs"). 
199 E.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153{b) (1979). 
200 C/. Kronman, supra note 31, at 7 n.18 (stating that when one party has no reason to 
know of error in contract, that party may usually enforce contract or recover damages based 
on reliance). 
201 Theoretically, if the seller wanted to use a term that was actually more efficient than a 
default term, but the cost of disclosing the information exceeded the gain in efficiency from 
the term, the seller would be forced to use the less efficient term. Let Cd = the cost of 
disclosure, B1 = the benefit of the term the seller wants to use, and B2 = the benefit of the 
default term. Thus, if Bl > B2 and Cd > Bl - B2, the seller would choose to avoid the extra 
cost and elect to use the default term. The loss in efficiency will equal Bl - Bz. 
Because default terms are presumed to be generally efficient, see supra te.xt accompany-
ing notes 190-93, in most cases the default term will be at least as efficient as the seller's 
desired terms. Even when the seller's term is more efficient, the default term v.i1l not be 
excessively inefficient. In other words, generally, B2 > B1• Thus, it can be expected that, in 
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sional judicial error, requiring only inefficient terms to be struck 
would tend to lead to more efficient form contract risk allocation. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations also is more economi-
cally. efficient than an alternate regimen relying on ambiguous or 
covert standards, such as unconscionability or the principle of in-
terpreting contracts against drafters.202 The explicit standard puts 
parties on notice of the relevant issues which would be considered 
by a court and permits the parties to adjust their actions accord-
ingly.203 Even if the first case brought under the standard were ex-
pensive, once the rule is announced it is available to guide future 
contracting parties and reduce contract transaction costs.204 
Some have argued that banning or restricting various subsidiary 
terms will harm poor consumers by raising the prices they must 
pay for goods and credit.205 This contention, however, is based only 
on considering sales price, without factoring in the added cost of 
subsidiary terms which shift risks to consumers.206 Thus, it is not 
at all self-evident that poor consumers ultimately will pay a higher 
total price. Moreover, enforcing all standard contract terms as 
drafted merely to lower sales prices for poor consumers falls into 
the category of paternalism: a nonefficient regimen whose sole jus-
tification is the protection of the welfare 'of certain individuals.207 
By contrast, the doctrine of reasonable expectations, which reduces 
information costs and decreases the likelihood of one party's un-
knowing assumption of risk, is easily justified on nonpaternalistio, 
most cases, Cd < B1 - B2, and the more efficient term will be utilized, despite the cost of 
disclosure. Even when B1 > B2, it is assumed that the default term is not irrational, and, 
therefore, the efficiency loss represented by B1 - B2 will not be great. When the loss is great, 
it will likely exceed the cost of disclosure, Cd < B1 - B2, and the more efficient term will be 
used. . 
202 In the words of Karl Llewellyn, "Covert tools are never reliable tools." Llewellyn, Booh 
Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939). It may still be necessary, however, to resort to 
unconscionability to interpret and to enforce contracts where there is truly no alternative 
for the consumer. See supra note 194. 
203 Craswell, supra note 18, at 728. 
20< Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 114. 
20. E.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 306-08; Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantivc 
Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1058-59 (1977). 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
201 A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 254. While the discussion of paternalism 
by Kronman and Posner focuses on the rationale for limitations on freedom of contract, the 
"conflict between paternalism and economic theory," id. at 257, is also encountered in 
choosing a framework for analyzing form contracts. 
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economic grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of consumer sovereignty must be adapted to the 
realities of the consumer form contract. The inevitability that con-
sumers will be ignorant of most form contract terms negates the 
presumption that these contracts are efficient. Efficiency requires 
voluntary, knowing assent. To create efficient results, the seller, as 
the drafter of the contract, must be motivated to disclose the exis-
tence and effect of subsidiary terms. By enforcing these terms only 
if they have been assented to by a knowledgeable consumer, courts 
will encourage disclosure by sellers. If form contracts are inter-
preted to include terms that the seller has led the consumer to be-
lieve were in the contract, sellers will be encouraged to avoid mis-
leading consumers, and consumers will receive what they rationally 
assumed they were purchasing. Finally, if subordinate written 
terms to which the consumer has not knowingly assented are re-
placed by presumptively efficient terms, consumer form contracts 
will more likely approach an efficient bargain. 
By applying an economics-based principle of reasonable expecta-
tions, courts can create true consumer sovereignty. Both parties to 
a consumer form contract will then be able to ascertain whether a 
proposed transaction increases their individual, and thus societal, 
wealth. 
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APPENDIX: AN EFFICIENCY PRIMER 
The term "efficiency" has a meaning to the economist that dif-
fers from its plain English usage. In general, a situation is consid-
ered economically efficient if it maximizes aggregate benefits less 
aggregate costS.208 Economists often use the word "utility" to de-
scribe the level of satisfaction derived from the consumption of 
particular goods and services.209 Judge Posner has evaluated utility 
by a "wealth-maximizing" criterion, one that measures utility by 
consumers' "willingness to pay for goods and services."210 
There are two main ways to evaluate whether one situation is 
more efficient than another. The first, called "Pareto superior-
ity,"211 exists when at least one person is better off after some 
change and none is worse off. A particular situation is "Pareto op-
timal" if any alteration in the allocation of benefits would lead to 
at least one person being worse off. It has been argued that Pareto 
superiority is an ethical way of allocating resources and that ra-
tional, self-interested people will consent to its use because at least 
one person's situation has improved but no one else has suffered.212 
In the real world, however, it is difficult to create changes that 
do not injure somebody. Therefore, economists have created a sec-
ond basis for evaluating efficiency, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.213 
This criterion, also called Potential Pareto Superiority, does not 
require that no one be injured by a change, but merely that the 
aggregate gain be larger than the aggregate loss.214 Although in 
208 A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 7. 
209 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 447 (13th ed. 1989); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 17, 
at 633 n.5. 
210 R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 10-12. 
211 The standard was first proposed in V. PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 369-75, 
451-62 (A. Schwier trans. 1971). 
212 Id. See generally Coleman, supra note 15, at 516-18 (elaborating on efficiency of 
Pareto judgments); Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 659, 663·64 
(1980). Judge Posner states that this consent can be implied from the "absence of system· 
atic distributive effects." Posner, Common Law Adjudication, supra note 12, at 506. It 
could be argued, however, that in a situation of greatly skewed income distribution, a Pareto 
superior move that only increased the wealth of the rich would injure the poorest by making 
them worse off comparatively, even though they suffered no monetary loss. 
213 This standard is derived from Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-
personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) and Hicks, The Foundation of 
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939). 
214 Posner, Common Law Adjudication, supra note 12, at 491. 
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theory this would permit compensation to injured parties,2111 actual 
compensation is not required for a situation to be superior under 
Kaldor-Hicks.216 Therefore, some people may well be worse off 
under such a regimen. Nonetheless, its use has been defended as 
having the implied consent of so'ciety because ex ante all would 
agree to a system whereby each change creates a net benefit to 
society.217 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion has been vigorously challenged. Be-
cause, unlike Pareto superiority, there are actual losers, evaluating 
the efficiency of a new situation requires comparing one party's 
losses with another's gains. Such "interpersonal comparisons of 
utility" are difficult, if not impossible.218 Additionally, since 
Kaldor-Hicks would permit a situation in which a few suffer cata-
strophic loss to create a small benefit for many, it is not self-evi-
dent that, even ex ante when the losers were unknown, all would 
consent simply because the total gain was greater than the total 
10ss.219 
Similar questions are raised about whether efficiency is at all a 
proper goal for the legal system. A chief complaint is that the focus 
on an individual's "willingness to pay" to achieve some perceived 
gain or to avoid some perceived risk underestimates the effects of 
the initial distribution of wealth. For example, the poor, with less 
money to pay, may be willing to pay all that they have, but they 
will still appear to value something less than wealthy people who 
are willing to pay a larger sum that represents only a tiny portion 
... Thus, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is essentially the same as wealth·maximization. See 
id.; see also supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. Accordingly, some have nrgued that 
the discussion of efficiency and the law would be clearer if the noneconomic sounding term 
"efficiency" were replaced with the more intuitively definable "wealth·maximization." 
Michelman, A Comment on SOME USES AND ABUSES OF EcONOMICS IN LAw, 46 U. CIIL 1.. RE\'. 
307, 309 n.9 (1979). 
218 Coleman, supra note 15, at 513. 
217 Posner, Common Law Adjudication, supra note 12, at 491-94. 
218 Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA 1.. REI.'. 563, 582-83 (1980); see also Coleman, 
supra note 15, at 519 (stating that process of determining whether one group's aggregate 
gain exceeds another's aggregate loss may reveal inconsistent preferences regardinl: social 
states and thus render Kaldor-Hicks "paradoxical as a standard of utility"). 
21. See Dworkin, supra note 218, at 578 (terming such consent "counterfactunI"). There 
are two. reasons a rational person might object to such a system. First, a risk-averse person 
would rather avoid the chance of suffering the large loss, even though it is more likely he 
would realize a small gain. Second, one might reject as unfair the cntnstrophic loss to inno-
cent parties, particularly where the benefit to others is small. 
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of their wealth.220 Thus, basing a system on willingness to pay ("of-
fer price"), rather than the price at which one would be willing to 
sell ("asking price"), biases the analysis against the poor.221 Simi-
larly, when only net societal gain or loss is considered, the starting 
points of societal members are disregarded.222 In other words, a 
change that would lift many out of poverty while causing monetary 
loss to the wealthy may be rejected solely because the poor would 
not gain as much as the rich would lose, even though more people 
might be helped than hurt and even though the percentage in-
crease in wealth for the poor people would far exceed the percent-
age of wealth lost by the rich.223 
Others have criticized reliance on efficiency because it fails to 
consider factors that are not monetary in nature. If a moral pre-
cept does not have a monetary value, it is not included in the 
equation.224 One proposed solution is to consider concepts such as 
justice or fairness as "veto points," so as to require that legal rules 
not only be efficient but also just.225 
Many proponents of the economic analysis of the law respond 
that considerations such as distributive justice or fairness are in-
herently subjective and uncertain.226 By contrast, economic effi-
ciency is defended as not only an "ethically attractive" goal, but, 
220 Economists use the phrase "wealth effects" to describe the impact of initial wealth on 
value estimations as reflected in the amount an individual is willing to pay to achieve some 
desired result. Thus, while a poor person may not be able to afford to pay much to avoid a 
loss, he might demand a substantially higher sum before he would willingly consent to bear 
the loss. A. POLINSKY, supra note 4, at 124-25; Bebchuk, The Pursuit 01 a Bigger Pie: Can 
Everyone Expect A Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 679-80 (1980). 
... Bebchuck, supra note 220, at 680. 
222 It has been argued, however, that the proper application of principles of law and eco· 
nomics does not require acceptance of the current societal distribution of wealth and prop· 
erty. For an insightful discussion of the "reformist law and economics," see Rose-Ackerman, 
Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341 
(1988). 
223 See Michelman, supra note 215, at 311 (describing wealth-maximization as "oblivious 
to distributive justice") . 
... Rizzo, supra note 9, at 641-46. Rizzo adds that if one includes noneconomic "moral· 
ism" by assigning it a hypothetical monetary value, then the resulting economic analysis will 
be "nonfalsifiable," and, thus, meaningless. Id. at 646·67. 
22. Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
553, 557-78 (1980). 
22. Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 5, at 292; see also Posner & Rosenfield, supra 
note 22, at 87 (criticizing judicial decisions based on "amorphous, ad hoc concepts [such] as 
fairness, equity and justice"). 
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perhaps more important, "objective" as well.227 
One need not resolve the debate over the ethical basis for an 
economic analysis of law to find it useful to evaluate legal rules in 
terms of their economic efficiency. Even if efficiency should not be 
the only goal of law, it represents·an "important, if not necessarily 
paramount, value."228 
Additionally, there is strong evidence that economic theory can 
help explain the development of the common law.229 Thus, a posi-
tive, as opposed to normative, use of economic analysis exists t{) 
explain what the law is, even if one chooses not to use economics to 
explore what the law should be.230 
Finally, economic analysis of the law can provide valuable in-
sights for the lawyer. Areas of the law previously perceived as un-
related sometimes prove to be quite similar when they relate to 
certain economic principles in a similar manner.231 Indeed, this 
"unifying perspective,"232 which helps the lawyer see new analogies 
and garner solutions from a wider variety of legal situations, may 
prove to be a use for the economic analysis of law that is beyond 
ideological contention. 
22' Posner, Common Law Adjudication, supra note 12, at 487. According to one commen-
tator, this argument implies that wealth maximization may be the only "socially uncon-
tested" value. Michelman, supra note 215, at 313. 
228 R POSNER, supra note 1, at 17. Indeed, as Judge Posner has argued, even if it cannot 
be proved that economics is the best source of legal analysis, once one accepts that econom-
ics helps measure costs relevant to policy decisions, it follows that economic analysis bas 
some role in the debate on legal issues. Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 5, at 287. 
229 R POSNER, supra note 1, at 404-07. The tendency of common law to reach efficient 
solutions has been attributed not to a conscious preference by judges but to the greater 
likelihood of litigation arising from inefficient rules. See id. at 439-40: Priest, The Common 
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67-75 (l977): Rubin, 
Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). Professor Rubin contends, 
however, that in situations where only one party has a long-term interest in the resolution of 
a dispute, that party will be likely to prevail eventually, even if the resolution is inefficient. 
[d. at 56. Because the costs of litigation are certain while the outcome is frequently in 
doubt, only the party with a long-term interest will have an economic incentive to keep 
litigating an issue until a favorable precedent is established. [d. 
Unlike the development of common law, the development of legislation is presumed to 
tend towards inefficiency, in part because compact interest groups can usually outbid diffuse 
ones for governmental benefits and assistance. Posner, Common Law Adjudication, supra 
note 12, at 503. 
230 Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 5, at 285. The purpose of positive analysis is to 
understand the world as it is, not improve it. [d. at 287. 
231 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 637 (stating that economics permits lawyers to 
see things like automobile accidents as "externalities," and thus similar, for example, to 
problems like pollution); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 118 (stating that same ec0-
nomics framework can be used to clarify many different areas of contract law). 
232 Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 638. 
